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A Federal Tete-A-Tete? The Multiparty, Multiforum

Trial Jurisdiction Act and Hurricane Katrina: Past,
Present, and Future Considerations
Thte-6- Thte:
1. Together without the presence of a thirdperson;face tolace.
Or
2. A private conversation between two persons.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The story of Hurricane Katrina is well-immersed in the
collective experience of most Americans, especially citizens in the
states directly affected by the storm's rampage. Almost every
aspect of this story has been analyzed and re-analyzed. The shortand long-term consequences of the storm have been the subject of
seemingly endless prognostication. The failure of government at
all levels to prepare for and to respond to the storm's tragedy has
been replayed by analysts for over two years. The response of the
judicial branch, however, has been a neglected aspect of this story.
The courts are today bearing the brunt of the storm's lasting
impact, and their response is of enormous consequence not only
for the parties to pending suits, but for wider efforts at rebuilding.
The judicial response also provides a bellwether for recent
congressional efforts to use federal court jurisdiction as a remedy
for long-standing problems with so-called "complex litigation"
involving multiple lawsuits filed in multiple courts following an
event.
A host of lawsuits were filed in various courts across Louisiana
following the storm. Defendants, mostly insurance companies,
began to invoke federal jurisdiction under a statute Congress
passed in 2002 called the Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction
Act ("MMTJA"). 2 The statute was the fruition of almost three
decades of attempts to remedy a particular set of problems with
situations like that of the multitude of suits filed after Hurricane
Katrina, an increasing phenomenon called "complex litigation."
This term is a shorthand reference for multiple lawsuits being filed
after the same event in various state and federal courts.3 The
application of the statute in the context of Katrina litigation
appears commonsensical since the MMTJA was passed with the
purpose of remedying situations like that following Hurricane
Katrina. Yet, counterintuitively, the Eastern District of Louisiana,
2. Twenty-First Century Department of Justice Appropriations
Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1826 (2002) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
3. H.R. REP. No. 107-685, at 199 (2002) (Conf. Rep.). For a fuller
explanation of the problems the MMTJA addresses, and the cause of these
problems, see infra Part II.B.
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the federal district court in which most of the suits involving the
MMTJA are pending, has uniformly remanded most of the
removed cases back to state court, in effect blunting the application
of the MMTJA. 4
This Comment summarizes and analyzes the jurisprudential
trend emerging from the Eastern District's remand decisions in an
effort to forecast its impact on the hurricane litigation and on the
MMTJA itself. The Comment provides a detailed examination of
the provisions of the MMTJA in Part 1I, and discusses the
problematic scenario that led to the enactment of the MMTJA. In
Part III, the Comment analyzes the impact of the MMTJA in the
litigation resulting from Hurricane Katrina, summarizing the
Eastern District jurisprudence. Part III also focuses on the policy
goals of the MMTJA, which provide a measuring stick with which
to assess that jurisprudence.
This assessment leads to the
conclusion that the federal court's interpretation has blunted the
MMTJA's effectiveness.
The Eastern District has narrowly interpreted the essential term
in the MMTJA, "accident," to conclude that Hurricane Katrina
itself is not an accident.5 This ruling serves to limit the exercise of
jurisdiction over most of the cases filed as a result of the storm.
The court has also developed an analysis of the particular nature of
the case and the number of parties to the suit in order to trim back
what the court sees as over-expansive removal provisions in the
statute. 6 This jurisprudential trend has been shaped by the Eastern
District's justified fear that, should it read the MMTJA in an
expansive manner, a flood of cases will swamp its already crowded
docket. 7 The Eastern District's fear may be enhanced by the U.S.
Fifth Circuit's holding that effectively prevented the only statutory
limitation on jurisdiction in the MMTJA from being applied to
most of the Katrina litigation. 8 This suggests that the Fifth
Circuit's reading of the MMTJA is considerably more expansive
4. See discussion infra, Part III.A.
5. Flint v. La. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., No. 06-2546, 2006 WL
2375593 (E.D. La. Aug. 15, 2006).
6. See discussion infra Parts III.C.2-3.
7. See discussion infra Part III.C.3.
8. Wallace v. La. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., 444 F.3d 697, 702 (5th Cir.
2006).
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than the Eastern District's. Nonetheless, the Eastern District's
interpretation may make the MMTJA another of Katrina's many
victims.
II. BACKGROUND: SETTING THE STAGE
The Eastern District's interpretation of the MMTJA statute
results in part from the novelty of the statute's provisions, which
are unlike any other jurisdictional statute ever passed. Part II of
the Comment summarizes those provisions of the statute which
have been at issue in the Katrina litigation. 9 This part also
discusses the particular problems with complex litigation and the
frustration with the previous inadequate remedies. It concludes by
discussing the proposed solution to these frustrations: a procedural
mechanism for consolidating these actions into one forum.
A. What Is the MMTJA? What Does It Do?
The MMTJA gives federal jurisdiction over a certain species of
cases arising from a common accident. The statute creates both
original jurisdiction' 0 and a kind of supplemental jurisdiction in
order to facilitate efficient management of the large number of
suits filed following an event."' The supplemental jurisdiction
empowers defendants named in actions in federal court under §
1369(a) to remove to federal court another action to which they are
12
a party, related to the same accident, brought in state court.
9. To that end, other provisions of the statute that have not been the subject
of litigation are not explored. The reader should be on notice that the
description of the provisions in the following subsection is not an exhaustive
analysis of all of the MMTJA. The MMTJA's provisions attempt to remedy the
problems at all the stages of complex litigation, some of which are detailed in
this Comment. Some of the other provisions not analyzed in this Comment
include the right of a party to intervene in an action in a district court, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1369(d) (2006), and the inability to appeal the decision of a federal court to

remand an action for a determination of damages, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(e)(4)
(2006). General provisions for appealing a remand order, 28 U.S.C. § 1453
(2006), are also relevant but are actually a part of the Class Action Fairness Act
of 2005.
10. § 1369(a).
11. § 1441(e)(1).
12.

Id.
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These main procedural provisions intend to facilitate the
multiple suits filed in multiple
aggregation in a federal forum 1of
3
courts following the same event.
1. § 1369(a): The Basic Provision
The MMTJA is codified, in part, at 28 U.S.C. § 1369.
Subsection (a) contains the basic statement of jurisdiction. The
statute gives the federal district courts "original jurisdiction" over
"civil action[s] involving minimal diversity between adverse
parties that arise[] from a single accident, where at least 75 natural
4 Minimal diversity exists
persons have died in the accident ....
when "any party is a citizen of a State and any adverse party is a
citizen of another State, a citizen or subject of a foreign state, or a
foreign state as defined in section 1603(a) of this title .... ,, 5 This
first provision manifests the MMTJA's novelty.
a. Minimal Diversity
In the MMTJA, it is clear that Congress intentionally departed
from the "complete diversity" rule, first enunciated in Strawbridge
v. Curtis.16 This rule requires that all adverse parties be citizens of

different states for there to be diversity jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1332.17 The Strawbridge rule has been criticized in
recent years because it has frustrated efforts to streamline
13.

H.R. REP. No. 107-685, at 199 (2002) (Conf. Rep.).

14. § 1369(a):
(a) In general.-The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of
any civil action involving minimal diversity between adverse parties

that arises from a single accident, where at least 75 natural persons
have died in the accident at a discrete location, if(1) a defendant resides in a State and a substantial part of the accident
took place in another State or other location, regardless of whether that

defendant is also a resident of the State where a substantial part of the
accident took place;

(2) any two defendants reside in different States, regardless of whether
such defendants are also residents of the same State or States; or
(3) substantial parts of the accident took place in different States.
15. § 1369(c)(1).
16.

7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).

17. Id.
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adjudicating in a single forum the multitude of suits filed following
accidents or disasters.' 8 By adopting minimal diversity, Congress
intends to remove the Strawbridge rule as an obstacle. It would
also seem that Congress has attempted to tailor the application of
the MMTJA to certain kinds of parties, such as corporate
defendants, who were previously prevented from removing cases
in which they were named to a single forum for efficient
adjudication. Oftentimes the complete diversity rule induced
parties to employ various strategies in order to prevent federal
diversity jurisdiction from being invoked. 19 As will be seen in the
later provisions, the move to expand jurisdiction, yet narrowly
tailor the application of the statute's provisions to particular cases
or parties, is a prominent feature in the MMTJA.2 °
b. Single Accident
Federal jurisdiction under the MMTJA is premised on "a single
accident, where at least 75 natural persons have died in the
accident at a discrete location." 2 1 This is a curious foundation for
federal jurisdiction, which has traditionally turned on the nature of
18.
19.

See discussion infra Part II.B.2.
An example of the sorts of strategies parties have utilized is detailed in

REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES AND THE WORKING

GROUP ON MASS TORTS TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES AND TO
THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 33, 34 (1999) [hereinafter
REPORT].

20. The move to minimal diversity in the MMTJA has not gone without
criticism. See, for example, C. Douglas Floyd, The Limits of Minimal Diversity,
55 HASTINGS L.J. 613 (2004), and JoEllen Lind, "ProceduralSwift": Complex
Litigation Reform, State Tort Law, and Democratic Values, 37 AKRON L. REV.
717 (2004), in which both authors criticize what they view as attempts to affect
substantive law via amendments to procedural rules, removing the possibility of
genuine democratic debate. The debate must be seen against the larger
backdrop of recent scholarly concerns over the continued viability of diversity
jurisdiction. Many criticize diversity jurisdiction for wasting scarce judicial
resources on cases of relative unimportance involving matters of state law. See,
for example, RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM

139 (1985), and Larry Kramer, Diversity Jurisdiction, 1990 BYU L. REV. 97
(1990), in which both authors criticize diversity jurisdiction for adding to the
overcrowded dockets of the federal courts, which prevents efficient adjudication
of claims.
21. 28 U.S.C. § 1369(a) (2006).
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the cause of action (federal question) or the citizenship of the
parties to the lawsuit (diversity), coupled in some instances with a
specific monetary amount in dispute. 22 Why is jurisdiction under
the MMTJA premised on the occurrence of an event with certain
Again, Congress is attempting to address a
characteristics?
particular set of cases that often arise after an accident or disaster
and cause significant judicial inefficiency. The progenitors of the
current MMTJA pointed out that the problems associated with
complex litigation result from situations where there is one cause
of injury, but the damages occur in a variety of places. 23 The
requirement that cases result from a single accident intends to
tailor the scope of this jurisdiction and at the same time provide a
forum to aggregate cases that would otherwise be filed in various
locations.
As with the shift to minimal diversity, the MMTJA at once
expands federal jurisdiction but targets that expansion to particular
By attempting to limit this jurisdiction to very
situations.
particular circumstances, Congress remains true to the basic intent
of the founders that the federal courts be of "limited" jurisdiction
and has targeted the statute's application to a particular situation to
inefficiency, inconsistent results,
resolve the problems of judicial
24
and increased litigation costs.
Airplane crashes exemplify the troublesome scenario Congress
has in mind.25 While the actual event, the crash itself, occurs at
one distinct location, the damages which will form the basis of any
lawsuits occur in various places. The plane's passengers are likely
to be citizens of any number of places and are likely to file suit in
their state of citizenship, resulting in multiple suits filed in various
places against the same defendants. These suits are likely to
22. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331-32 (2006).
23. See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. & Kenneth D. Sibley, Beyond Diversity:
FederalMultiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 7, 16 (1986).
For further analysis of the unique solution proposed in this seminal article, see
infra Part II.B.2.
24.

HOWARD P. FINK ET AL., FEDERAL COURTS IN THE 21ST CENTURY:

CASES & MATERIALS 12 (2d ed. 2002).

25. H.R. REP. No. 107-685, at 200 (2002) (Conf. Rep.) (referring to airplane
crashes as being a prime example of the sort of situation giving rise to complex
litigation).
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revolve around the same issue of liability, to require discovery of
the same evidence, and will mirror the other suits in many respects,
save that of damages. Moreover, if the plaintiffs attempt to
aggregate their claims, the likelihood of complete diversity
decreases. This situation obviously wastes judicial resources and
increases the costs of litigation. Congress has attempted to provide
a remedy 2in6 the MMTJA by expanding federal jurisdiction over
these suits.
2. Tailoring the Basic Provision's Reach
Congress further tailored the jurisdictional reach of the federal
courts under the MMTJA by adding three "qualifications" intended
to address situations where dispersed litigation following the same
event is most likely to occur. 27 For jurisdiction
to be proper any
28
exist.
also
must
situations
three
these
one of
First, federal jurisdiction is proper if "a defendant resides in a
State and a substantial part of the accident took place in another
State or other location, regardless of whether that defendant is also
a resident of the State where a substantial part of the accident took
place . . ,29 The statute defines a corporation to be a resident of
any state "in which it is incorporated or licensed to do business or
is doing business ... ."30 It retains the traditional dual citizenship
of corporations, that of the state
of incorporation and the state of its
31
business.
of
place
principal

26. A third distinctive feature is the statute's requirement that the single
accident result in the death of "at least 75 natural persons." § 1369(a). This
requirement caused some initial confusion among practitioners because it
suggested the statute was only applicable in suits seeking damages for the deaths
of those (at least) seventy-five persons, when in fact the number of deaths is
relevant only to the nature of the accident, not the type of claim arising out of it.
For a brief discussion dispelling this confusion, see Peter Adomeit, The Station
Nightclub Fireand FederalJurisdictionalReach: The Multidistrict,Multiparty,
Multiforum JurisdictionAct of 2002, 25 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 243, 249 (2003).
27. § 1369(a)(1)-(3).
28. Id.
29. § 1369(a)(1).
30. § 1369(c)(2).
31. Id.
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The second possible situation in which federal courts have
original jurisdiction exists when "any two defendants reside in
different States, regardless of whether such defendants are also
residents of the same State or States .... 02
Finally, if "substantial parts of the accident took place in
33
different States," a federal district court has original jurisdiction.
The purpose of these additional requirements is to limit and target
the jurisdictional reach of federal courts, and to quell
congressional
34
fears about the breadth of this jurisdictional grant.
3. Abstainingfrom Jurisdiction:§ 1369(b)
Congressional qualms over the scope of this jurisdiction were
caused by the possibility of cases that are really and truly
"intrastate" being swept into federal court.3 5 The statute attempts
to address these concerns, not only through the limiting
qualifications (§ 1369(a)(1)-(3)), but also by the inclusion of an
"abstention" provision in § 1369(b). 6 The abstention provision,
like the three qualifications set out in § 1369(a), is intended to limit
the reach of the federal courts and attempts to make clear what
kind of case a federal court should not hear. The abstention
provision requires that a federal district court not hear a case
"described in subsection (a) in which--(1) the substantial majority
32. § 1369(a)(2).
33. § 1369(a)(3).
34. Laura Offenbacher, Comment, The Multiparty, Multiforum Trial
JurisdictionAct: Opening the Door to Class Action Reform, 23 REv. L1TIG. 177,
192-93 (2004).
35. Id. at 192. The House report accompanying the statute notes that the
fear of such expansive change to federal jurisdiction was a primary factor
preventing earlier versions of the Act from being passed. H.R. REP. No. 107685, at 199 (2002) (Conf. Rep.).
36. The abstention provision reads:
(b) Limitation of jurisdiction of district courts.-The district court shall
abstain from hearing any civil action described in subsection (a) in
which(1) the substantial majority of all plaintiffs are citizens of a single State
of which the primary defendants are also citizens; and
(2) the claims asserted will be governed primarily by the laws of that
State.
§ 1369(b).

690

LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 68

of all plaintiffs are citizens of a single State of which the primary
defendants are also citizens; and (2) the claims asserted will be
governed primarily by the laws of that State." 37 Federal courts
should not exercise federal jurisdiction over cases that are
essentially local controversies between local parties.
4. Removing Cases to FederalCourt: § 1441(e)
In 28 U.S.C. § 1441, the final provision of the MMTJA
relevant for the purposes of this Comment, a significant change is
In § 1441(e)(1), a
wrought to general removal procedures.
defendant in a civil action brought in state court can "remove that
action to the district court of the United States for the district and
division embracing the place where the action is pending" in two
circumstances delineated in § 1441(e)(1)(A) and (B). Subsection
(A) allows the defendant to remove a case pending in state court to
federal court if the action presently in state court "could have been
brought in a United States district court under section 1369 of this
title.",38 More significantly, subsection (B) allows a defendant to
remove a pending state action to federal court if
the defendant is a party to an action which is or could have
been brought, in whole or in part, under section 1369 in a
United States district court and arises from the same
accident as the action in State court, even if the action to be
37. Id. The abstention provision has caused substantial interpretive
problems and has drawn the most criticism for its use of inherently vague terms
such as "substantial majority" of plaintiffs, or "primary defendants." The nature
of § 1369(b) has also been the subject of litigation. The earliest case to interpret
the MMTJA, Passav. Derderian, involved the question of whether § 1369(b) is
an abstention provision, which requires a court to refrain from hearing a case it
otherwise has jurisdiction over, or whether it is a denial or exclusion of federal
jurisdiction over cases to which the section applies. 308 F. Supp. 2d 43 (D.R.I.
2004). The court held that the provision is an abstention concept, not a denial of
jurisdiction. Id. at 51.
38. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(e)(1)(A) (2006):
(e)(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) of this section,
a defendant in a civil action in a State court may remove the action to
the district court of the United States for the district and division
embracing the place where the action is pending if(A) the action could have been brought in a United States district court
under section 1369 of this title; or
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removed could not39have been brought in a district court as
an original matter.
The second provision allows a federal court to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction in a case over which it otherwise would
not properly have jurisdiction under § 1369(a).4 °
B. Where Did the MMTJA Come From?
This section of the Comment traces the development of the
MMTJA, focusing on the problems that caused scholars to suggest
the MMTJA as a solution. Both the problems and the proposed
solution reveal Congress' purpose in passing the MMTJA.
Understanding this purpose, in turn, serves as a measuring stick to
ascertain the effectiveness of the MMTJA in present Katrina
litigation.
1. The Problem of Complex Litigation
The key to comprehending the purpose of the MMTJA is in
understanding how litigation has changed since the complete
diversity rule was first enunciated in Strawbridge v. Curtis. A
significant development in litigation in recent decades has been the
appearance of so-called "complex litigation. ' 42 Pinning down
exactly what the phrase "complex litigation" refers to is as tricky
as finding solutions to the problems it poses, but scholars have
isolated some of the recurring features of this type of litigation.
(B) the defendant is a party to an action which is or could have been
brought, in whole or in part, under section 1369 in a United States
district court and arises from the same accident as the action in State
court, even if the action to be removed could not have been brought in a
district court as an original matter.
39. § 1441(e)(1)(B).
40. Angela J. Rafoth, Congress and the Multiparty, Multiforum Trial
JurisdictionAct of 2002: Meaningful Reform or a Comedy of Errors?, 54 DUKE
L.J. 255, 269-72 (2004).
41. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806). See discussion supra Part II.A.l.a.
42. For a general empirical analysis of the increase in complex litigation
and its impact on the judicial process, see Deborah R. Hensler, The Role of
Multi-Districtingin Mass Tort Litigation:An EmpiricalInvestigation, 31 SETON
HALL L. REv. 883 (2001) (surveying the dockets of courts to determine the
increase in cases filed).
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The first feature of complex litigation is numerosity. Disasters
lead to the filing of a multitude of suits in various places against
the same defendants, which require the resolution of similar basic
legal issues. a3 Typical examples of these sorts of events are
exposure to asbestos and airplane crashes. 44
The second defining feature of complex litigation is collective
pursuit of the claims, as lawyers coordinate litigating a high
number of cases.4 5 Coordination has significant advantages. If
each claim were individually pursued, the low value of the
particular claim would generally serve to prevent the claim from
being brought.46 However, consolidating the individual claims
increases their economic worth, making the cases more enticing to
pursue because more is at stake financially. It is the classic
example of the old adage, "The whole is greater than its individual
parts." By pursuing these claims collectively, significant economic
interests are brought to bear, raising the stakes in the litigation.47
Pursuing a large number of individual claims in a collective
fashion against a few defendants also provides lawyers with
significant leverage in negotiating settlements.48
Despite efforts at coordination, large numbers of claims raise
the potential for "relitigation of identical or nearly identical
issues," with the concomitant risks of such litigation. 49 Because a
single incident or exposure to a single product results in the filing
43. REPORT, supra note 19, at 14 (noting that claimants may number in the
millions).
44. Hensler, supra note 42, at 887; Thomas E. Baker, A View to the Future
of Judicial Federalism: "Neither Out Far Nor In Deep ", 45 CASE W. RES. L.
REv. 705, 765 (1995).
45. Hensler, supra note 42, at 888.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 889. The features of collectivity are not appealing solely to
plaintiff lawyers. The benefits of collectivization to defendants are two-fold.
First, strategic advantages are gained from consolidating an otherwise untold
number of individual claims into a single suit. Id. Consolidation cuts down
significantly on overall litigation costs, for one thing. Secondly, there is
significant economic advantage to settling a large action once and for all rather
than risking multiple litigation, and the potential exposure to large judgments.

Id.
49.

Baker, supranote 44, at 768.
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of a high number of claims, if each is pursued individually, the
same basic legal issues would be re-litigated in each case. The
problems with such recurrent litigation are obvious. Litigation
costs are increased as more lawyers fight over the same pieces of
evidence and litigate the same issues of liability. The re-litigation
wastes judicial resources, which will be spent resolving
substantially the same issue again and again.
Finally, the
defendant 50may be subject to the possibility of inconsistent
judgments.
Over time, dissatisfaction grew over the inability to remedy the
problems with complex litigation.
This criticism gradually
centered on the complete diversity rule, which prevented total
aggregation of the cases in a federal forum. 51 Complete diversity2
requires all adverse parties to be citizens of different states.
Because of the large number of plaintiffs who bring suits after
disasters, and the definition of corporate citizenship in 28 U.S.C. §
1332, the probability was very high that complete diversity would
not exist between the parties, and the federal forum would be
consequently foreclosed.
2. The Remedy: Aggregation in FederalCourt
A number of solutions to the problems outlined above were
suggested prior to the 2002 passage of the MMTJA. In 1986,
Thomas Rowe and Kenneth Sibley made a significant proposal in a
seminal law review article entitled Beyond Diversity: Federal
Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction.53 The article noted the need
for expanded federal jurisdiction in order to redress the
"unavailability of any single forum in which to consolidate
scattered, related litigation," a situation they also noted was
occurring with almost daily regularity because of the nature of
54
litigation in the (then) latter part of the twentieth century.
However, their proposal was novel for its insistence that this new
"multiparty, multiforum" jurisdiction be based on the residence of
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Rowe & Sibley, supra note 23, at 15.
Id. at 20.
Strawbridge v. Curtis, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
Rowe & Sibley, supra note 23, at 7.
Id. at 9.
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a defendant, and in particular whether "any defendant has a
residence in a state other than one where a substantial part of the
events ... giving rise to the claim occurred., 55 It is not a mere
coincidence that this proposal appears almost verbatim in the
current statute.
U.S. Supreme Court rulings that imposed constitutional limits
on state court in personam jurisdiction precipitated the turn to
Because of these
federal jurisdiction as the adequate remedy.
limitations, Rowe and Sibley argued, "the states alone cannot
resolve the problem of scattered litigation resulting from
multiparty, multiforum disputes." 57 At the same time, federal
diversity jurisdiction, especially the Strawbridge complete
diversity rule, offered a blunted resolution of the problem. 58 The
solution they presented required federal action to remove barriers
and to embrace an expansion of jurisdiction based not on
citizenship, but on the defendant's residence. Basing this proposed
jurisdiction on whether a defendant sued in a case arising out of a
single injury-causing event was a resident of a state where a part of
the event did not occur was necessary, according to Rowe and
Sibley, to tailor the jurisdiction to the precise situation it was
attempting to remedy. They wrote: "The focus on dispersions of
events and defendants should be the core of the definition of a
federal action-consolidating jurisdiction, for such a definition
includes only those cases in which scattered litigation is
possible." 59 The solution, again, was to turn to federal court,
particularly diversity jurisdiction, and allow cases that involved
55. Id.at 11.
56. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286
(1980). In World-Wide, the plaintiffs were citizens of New York but were
injured in a car accident in Oklahoma. Id. at 288. They brought suit in
Oklahoma state court against the manufacturer of the car, a foreign corporation,
the importer, a regional distributor, and the retailer who sold them the car, also a
citizen of New York. Id. The regional distributor and retailer objected to the
suit in Oklahoma, arguing the court did not have in personam jurisdiction over
them. Id. at 288-89. The Supreme Court upheld their objection, finding that
they lacked sufficient contacts with the forum to justify suit there. Id.at 291.
57. Rowe & Sibley, supra note 23, at 18-19.
58. Id.at 19-22 (surveying various other federal procedural remedies and
their shortcomings to solve the dispersed litigation problem).
59. Id. at 28.
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minimally diverse parties and defendants who were residents of a
state where a "substantial" part of the events did not occur to be
This solution
brought in or removed to federal court.
circumvented both the constitutional limitations on state court
jurisdiction and the requirement of complete diversity that had
prevented the federal courts from providing a single forum for
consolidation.
1II.

ANALYSIS: KATRINA MEETS THE

MMTJA

Redundant, repetitive litigation resulting from a single event
threatens the judicial process with increased costs and inconsistent
judgments against the same defendants and wastes scarce judicial
resources. Hurricane Katrina heightened the threat of these
problems as a high number of lawsuits were filed in its wake. It is
natural to assume that the MMTJA should affect the resolution of
these suits. A mere two weeks after the storm's end, defendants
began to invoke the MMTJA to remove cases filed in state court to
federal court.
The following section addresses the impact the
MMTJA is having in the Katrina litigation. Examining these
decisions conclusively shows that the statute is having a muted
impact, a counterintuitive result given the policy issues at stake in
the original passage of the MMTJA and the Katrina litigation.
Part III describes the overall jurisprudential trend resulting
from the removal and remand motions filed by parties and assesses
this trend by weighing the results against the policies at stake in the
Katrina litigation. Part III concludes by attempting to forecast
what this trend means for the post-Katrina litigation context and

60. Chehardy v. La. Ins. Comm'r, No. 05-1140 (M.D. La. filed March 16,
2006). Chehardy was removed to the Middle District of Louisiana from the
19th Judicial District in East Baton Rouge Parish and later transferred to the
Eastern District of Louisiana. In the Eastern District of Louisiana it was
consolidated with other cases resulting from the levee breaches, and heard by
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. See In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol.
Litig., 495 F.3d 191 (5th Cir. 2007). For a complete review of Chehardy's
procedural travails, see Petition for Writ of Mandamus Under 28 U.S.C. § 1651,
or Alternatively Appeal Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 of Collateral Order at 1-3, In
Re La. Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co. & La. Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co., No.
06-0114 (5th Cir. June 16, 2006) [hereinafter Petition].
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for future application of the MMTJA itself outside of the Katrina
context.
A. The JurisprudentialTrend
From a relatively few number of cases, it is difficult to distill a
pattern for analysis and critique. First, the reported cases are still
pending in both federal and state court and, secondly, there are
likely to be some pending cases that have not produced written
opinions. 6 1 Furthermore, no single model of litigation in the
Katrina context has yet emerged; there is no ideal case to
analyze.62 Nonetheless, a common thread does emerge because the
cases discussed have all arisen as a result of Hurricane Katrina and
have all sought to utilize the MMTJA.
The reported decisions indicate that the participants in this
litigation, particularly the judges interpreting the statute, are being
confronted for the first time with a relatively new situation. To
this end, the judges and lawyers are literally "thinking on their
feet" when it comes to the MMTJA.63 The federal judges of
Louisiana's Eastern District face the unenviable task of sorting
through what Congress has done in the MMTJA in an incredibly
difficult context.
Close analysis of the cases suggests the
beginning of a jurisprudential trend. Briefly, it can be summarized
in three essential elements.
First, the judges of the Eastern District of Louisiana appear to
have concluded that for purposes of MMTJA jurisdiction,
Hurricane Katrina itself does not suffice as the required "single

61. It is also important to remember that in many instances a judge may not
issue written reasons for denying a motion to remand. Such decisions are
usually not appealable until the conclusion of the case.
62. Some cases, for example, have been pursued individually, while in
others the plaintiffs have petitioned for class certification. For an example of the
former, see Flint v. Louisiana Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co., No. 062546, 2006 WL 2375593, at *3 (E.D. La. Aug. 15, 2006). Chehardy is an
example of the latter type of case. See supra note 60.
63. Moreover, the context of the litigation itself and the intensely emotional
and politically charged atmosphere surrounding these suits increases the
difficulties being faced by the judges. People have lost their homes, their
property, and their possessions.
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accident." 64 Second, the removal provisions in § 1441(e)(1)
dominate this litigation because only a few cases have invoked
original jurisdiction under § 1369(a). However, the broad removal
provisions give the Eastern District the nightmare of a flood of
cases being swept into an already crowded system. This nightmare
has led the court to look to policy considerations in an effort to
trim back the removal provision. The judges look to the original
purpose of the MMTJA to determine if a case seeking removal to
federal court measures up to the kind of case that Congress would
have clearly wanted to be in federal court. In the opinion of the
judges of the Eastern District, while the plain language of §
1441(e)(1)(B) would allow many cases to be removed, the policy
implications in the MMTJA cut against the exercise of federal
jurisdiction. Finally, the cases decided thus far center on remand
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, because the U.S. Fifth
Circuit has correctly held that the abstention provision in § 1369(b)
does not apply to cases removed under § 1441(e)(1)(B).65
B. Assessing the Trend: The MeasuringStick
Understanding the significant policy implications at stake in
the Katrina litigation provides a guidepost for critically appraising
the jurisprudential trend described above. The policy
considerations in the post-Katrina litigation are those traditionall!y
present in all litigation-judicial efficiency and fairness.
Congress, the courts, and the parties to litigation want efficient
resolution to claims brought in court. Long dockets mean that
lawsuits take longer to resolve, grievances go unaddressed, and
self-resolution of issues appears as a more salient method of
problem-solving. Parties to litigation must also feel as though their
case was fairly decided and that, win or lose, no bias on the part of
the court influenced the outcome. The perception of fixed or
biased judicial outcomes could be detrimental to a judicial system
that in large part relies upon the power of the pen to enforce its
64. Flint, 2006 WL 2375593, at *3.
65. See Wallace v. La. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., 444 F.3d 697 (5th Cir.
2006). The abstention provision may still apply to cases under 28 U.S.C. §
1441 (e)(1)(A) (2006).

66. See generally FINK ET AL., supra note 24.
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judgments. In the context of the Katrina litigation, it is vital that
claimants who have suffered significant property damage achieve
fair results in as efficient a manner as possible. At the same time,
fairness requires that insurance companies have access to courts
and a fair opportunity to defend suits against them by
policyholders.
Congress passed the MMTJA for the purpose of providing the
federal courts with the needed tools to achieve efficient and fair
adjudication of complex litigation.
The House report
accompanying the statute states that its primary purpose is to
"streamline the process by which multidistrict litigation governing
disasters [is] adjudicated., 67 The House report also delineates
what Congress saw as the "need" for the statute. Numerous
lawsuits are filed in several states, in both the federal and state
systems, involving lots of lawyers and several defendants, and the
same basic issue is re-litigated. Having to litigate this basic issue
over and over causes significant problems: waste of scarce judicial
resources and higher costs to litigants. Furthermore, then-current
federal statutes unintentionally inhibited consolidation of these
cases in a single forum. 6 8 The policy implications in the MMTJA
match those traditionally present in litigation and are heightened
by the circumstances of Hurricane Katrina: efficient and fair
adjudication of claims.
C. Analyzing the Individual Components
These pressing policy considerations provide an adequate
measuring stick to assess the particular components of the
emerging jurisprudential trend.
1. Katrina as a "Single Accident"
The first component of the jurisprudential trend is the Eastern
District's conclusion in Flint v. Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance
Co. that Hurricane Katrina itself is not a "single accident." 69 Flint
was a suit between individual policyholders and their insurance
67. H.R. REP. No. 107-685, at 199 (2002) (Conf. Rep.).
68. Id.at 200.
69. Flint,2006 WL 2375593, at *3.
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company for damages following Farm Bureau's denial of certain
claims related to landscaping. 7° The plaintiff filed suit in state
court in St. Tammany Parish, and the defendant removed the case
to the Eastern District, relying on § 1441(e)(1)(B) because it was
also a named party in a case already pending in the Eastern
District, Craddock v. Safeco Insurance Co. 7 1 The plaintiff then
filed a motion to remand the case to state court, which was
granted.72 The issue for Judge Duval was whether Craddock was
properly brought under § 1369(a), which turned on whether
Hurricane Katrina itself was a "single accident." 73 Judge Duval
concluded that for purposes of § 1369(a), Hurricane Katrina was
not a "single accident," and that the basis for jurisdiction upon
74
which the defendant relied (Craddock) was therefore improper.
Judge Duval determined that while the hurricane was a necessary
antecedent, the hurricane itself was the not the accident, nor did75it
cause a "single" accident at the heart of either Craddock or Flint.
What assessment can be made of this restriction of the term
accident? In reaching his conclusion in Flint, Judge Duval
appeared to be relying on the plain language of the statute. As
already mentioned, § 1369(c)(4) defines "accident" as "a sudden
accident, or a natural event culminating in an accident ....,76
Judge Duval read this provision and concluded from the
construction of the second phrase that Hurricane Katrina itself
could not be considered the "accident." He wrote, "[H]urricane
Katrina was the natural event under § 1369 that culminated in
many accidents." 77 Thus, for Duval, the second phrase draws a
70. Id. at*1.
71. 2006 WL 2375523 (E.D. La. Aug. 15, 2006) (voluntarily dismissed
8/15/06).
72. Flint, 2006 WL 2375593, at *4.

73. Id.
74. Id.
75. While finding that no previous opinion had ever defined Katrina as the
single accident for purposes of the MMTJA, he stated in his opinion that the
levee breach caused by Hurricane Katrina would qualify as a single accident.
Id. at *3. Thus he drew a somewhat subtle distinction between cases resulting
from the levee breaks, such as Chehardy, and those which appear to be more
"run of the mill" damages caused by a hurricane. See, e.g., id.
76. 28 U.S.C. § 1369(c)(4) (emphasis added).
77. Flint, 2006 WL 2375593, at *3.
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distinction between a natural event and an accident, precluding the
natural event from being an accident. Furthermore, he concluded
that "Hurricane Katrina was the natural event that culminated [sic]
in the levee break that caused at least 75 deaths at a discrete
location. Therefore, the levee break, not Hurricane Katrina, was
the § 1369 accident." 78 Because the second phrase expressly
distinguishes between a "natural event" and a "sudden accident"
triggering jurisdiction under § 1369, Judge Duval concluded that
Hurricane Katrina, obviously
a natural event, could not itself
79
qualify as the "accident."
Judge Duval's conclusion appears reasonable given his
construction of the unusual definition of "accident" in the statute.
No commentator had previously given much thought to the
question of what Congress meant in using the word "accident."
The only consideration of the term prior to Hurricane Katrina
appeared in the context of a discussion about the role of "intent" in
determining if an event was an accident for purposes of §
1369(a). 80 The commentary raised the question of whether events
such as criminal acts or terrorism, which involve human
participants acting with full intent to cause harm, could be
considered accidents under § 1369. Policy considerations, it was
suggested, might dictate against a narrow interpretation of
"accident." 81 The author argued that the "accident characteristics
likely to affect subsequent litigation" should determine the
meaning of the term. 82 The fact that a particular event, whatever
its nature, results in "duplicative, redundant litigation" should be
the controlling factor in drawing conclusions about what events are
83
and are not accidents.
One could argue that any distinction between natural events
and accidents should fail because of the same argument-that of
the policy reasons underlying the statute. Although Judge Duval's
conclusion in Flint is based on a thoughtful, considered
interpretation of the plain language of the statute, the § 1369(c)(4)
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id.
Id.
Rafoth, supra note 40.
Id.at 263.
Id.
Id.
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definition of accident is anything but "plain." 84 The meaning of
the term is not self-evident from the language of the statute, and in
order to determine its meaning, a judge should look to the purpose
of the statute being interpreted. Whatever meaning is ascribed to
"accident" should be such that it accords with and effectuates the
MMTJA's purpose. The fact that a natural event, like a hurricane,
causes redundant, duplicative litigation over the same basic issues
should control the meaning ascribed to "accident." The clear
policy of the MMTJA is to redress situations like that in Hurricane
Katrina and to efficiently coordinate the aggregation of claims in a
single forum to avoid the concomitant problems when complex
litigation proceeds absent such efforts. Judge Duval's reading is
plausible, no doubt, based on the unusual definition of accident in
§ 1369(c)(4), but it serves to prevent the implementation of the
MMTJA's aggregative policy. The Flint holding excludes the
majority of cases that resulted from the hurricane from being
aggregated with other claims on the basis of a rather fine
distinction drawn by the definition between a natural event and a
sudden accident.
Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
suggests an interpretive approach which bolsters the argument
against a narrow interpretation of the term "accident." This
approach is ripe for consideration in the context of Hurricane
Katrina because Judge Posner suggests this interpretive technique
in his book detailing the challenges facing the federal courts, not
the least of which are overcrowded dockets. 85 His proposal is twofold. First, the judge should take the advice of Atticus Finch 86 and
put himself in another's skin. The judge's primary consideration
84. There are plain language counter-arguments to Judge Duval's reading of

the statute. It could be argued that his disjunctive reading of the second phrase
("or a natural event that culminating in a sudden accident") is misplaced. See
supra text accompanying note 75. As mentioned, he read this phrase as
implicitly distinguishing the "natural event" from the "sudden accident." An
alternative reading of the phrase leads to the conclusion that the phrase refers to
the natural event leading to the accident. This alternative reading sees the
accident and natural event as a whole as one simultaneous event. Hurricane
Katrina qualifies as an accident under this reading of the statute.
85. POSNER, supranote 20, at 261.
86. HARPER LEE, To KILL A MOCKINGBIRD 33 (35th Anniversary ed.,
HarperCollins 1995) (1960).
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in interpreting a statute should be to consider how the legislators
who enacted the statute would have wanted the statute to be
applied in the particular case. Posner calls this "the method of
imaginative reconstruction." 87 His second interpretive approach
can be utilized when the first method is inapplicable. The judge
should decide in such a way that will yield the most reasonable
result in the case at hand. 88 There is, of course, an inherent
vagueness in Posner's second interpretive consideration. Despite
this vagueness, however, Judge Posner's approach has the appeal
of a commonsensical solution. It avoids significant debate over
plain language or the role of legislative history in the interpretation
of any statute, and goes to the heart of the matter: what result does
the legislature want? 89
Before applying Judge Posner's interpretative technique to the
interpretation of Hurricane Katrina as an "accident," a brief
historical note shows that Judge Posner's approach is far from
novel. The Posnerian technique is actually of venerable lineage
within the common law, stemming from Sir Edward Coke's90
articulation of this technique in the celebrated Heydon's Case.
The issue before the court was whether copyhold interests, a
method of property seizure omitted from a statute aimed at
increasing the power of the king to seize church property, was
therefore regulated by the statute. 91 In deciding the case, Coke
articulated the general canon that the judge should consider the
common law, the "mischief' the common law did not solve, and
87.
88.

POSNER, supranote 20, at 287.
Id.

89. Some scholars and jurists assert the so-called "plain language" argument
to counter Judge Posner's interpretive suggestions. Members of this interpretive
school question the turn to congressional purpose or intent altogether. They
charge that a divination of purpose from a piece of legislation is impossible
because each legislator brings his or her own subjective purpose to bear when
voting for or against legislation. For more on this counter-argument, see Max
Radin, Statutory Interpretation,43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 870 (1929). While an
interesting conversation, entertaining it detracts from the primary purpose of this
article, which tells the story of the MMTJA and its impact in the Katrina

litigation.
90. 76 Eng. Rep. 637, 638 (Exch. 1584).
91. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DuKE L.J.
1215, 1219-20 (2001).
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the remedy devised by the legislature. 92 After this, the judge
should give the statute such "construction as shall suppress the
mischief, and advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle
inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief ....

In

this statement lies the very essence of Judge Posner's suggested
technique some 600 years later. 94 Focus on the wrong, focus on
the remedy, and interpret the statute to achieve the remedy.
Utilizing Judge Posner's interpretive approach leads to the
conclusion that "accident" should be interpreted to include
Hurricane Katrina. 95 After all, re-imagining what Congress wants
from the statute is not difficult: aggregation in a single forum of
cases resulting from the same triggering event. This much should
be clear from the express statements in the House Report, as well
as the significant commentary leading up to and following the
statute's passage, as detailed above. Clearly, like a fire or an
airplane crash, Hurricane Katrina has resulted in a mass of
litigation which will require re-litigation of the same basic legal
issues. The Katrina litigation presents the same nightmare scenario
that concerned Congress in passing the MMTJA of multiple suits
filed in various fora involving some of the same defendants. It
likewise threatens to waste judicial resources, increase litigation
costs, and potentially yield inconsistent judgments. There is no
plausible ground, then, for any distinction between a natural event
and an accident given the policy implications in the Katrina
litigation.
Applying Judge Posner's second approach, the most reasonable
result in this situation is aggregation of the cases in a single forum.
Absent aggregation, the largest insurance companies operating in
Louisiana are likely to be subject to untold numbers of lawsuits,
92. Heydon's Case, 76

ENG. REP.

at 638.

93. Id.
94. For a vivid and enlightening discussion of the this seminal case, see Eric
Tucker, The Gospel of Statutory Rules Requiring Liberal Interpretation
L.J. 113, 118-23 (1985).
95. The use of Judge Posner's suggestion is intended to assist in framing an
alternative meaning of "accident." Judge Duval, however, concludes that the
plain language of the statute precludes Hurricane Katrina from being the "single
accident." In other words, according to the traditional rules of statutory
interpretation, there is no need to go beyond the plain text.
According to St. Peter's, 35 U. TORONTO
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costing hundreds of thousands of dollars to litigate, potentially
subjecting the insurance companies to inconsistent judgments and
wasting the resources of state courts. At the same time, plaintiffs
could benefit from aggregation by the pooling of resources, time,
and talent, which could significantly increase their tactical
position. The politically disadvantageous appearance of ensuring
insurance companies a fair opportunity to defend claims also
strengthens the case for the federal forum. High numbers of
uncoordinated suits may ultimately result in increasing insurance
costs above their already elevated state, threatening the economic
viability of this important industry. The state forum, with elected
judges, is particularly susceptible of being swayed by the political
winds currently blowing in Louisiana and makes the federal forum,
more removed from these winds, appropriate.
The Eastern District's definition remains counterintuitive given
the fact that the precise situation that concerned Congress has
occurred following Hurricane Katrina. The problem, no doubt the
federal judges themselves will agree, is the statute itself. The §
1369(c)(4) definition of accident is unhelpful. The statute's odd
definition of its essential term, "accident," unfortunately invites the
court, concerned as it appears to be with the possibility of being
swamped with cases, to define the term in a restrictive manner. To
rectify this situation, Congress should amend the statute in order to
broaden the definition beyond fires, airplane crashes, and levee
breaches in order to achieve the policy which underlies it.
2. Getting into the Dance:Removal Under § 1441(e)(1)
Judge Duval's holding in Flint results not only from the
construction of the definition of accident in § 1369(c)(4), but in
part because Flint was a suit that relied upon § 1441(e)(1)(B) for
jurisdiction. This provision is probably what has shaped the
Eastern District's reading of the statute more than any other
consideration. While no judge has explicitly stated this, such a
conclusion is not hard to discern between the lines. The expansive
removal provisions are getting pushed to the limits by the attempts
to remove cases to federal court, and the court is seeking ways,
extra-textually, to "trim" them. Restricting the meaning of
accident is a part of the judicial attempt to rein in a very broad
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removal provision that threatens to flood the federal system with
cases that might more properly belong in state court. Seen another
way, while the MMTJA attempts to rectify the impossibility of
aggregation, the removal provisions threaten another danger: overaggregation.
The possibility of over-aggregation was not a concern in the
early analysis of the statute. 96 Over-aggregation implicates similar
problems to under-aggregation.
It threatens to waste scarce
judicial resources, making adjudication of claims inefficient. This
conclusion obviously follows from having more cases but the same
number of judges to handle them, increasing the amount of time
required to handle cases. The court's concern with the broadness
of § 1441 (e)(1)(B) is well founded. The MMTJA may threaten
more problems than solutions on this front and may weaken the
statute's attempt to achieve efficient results in complex litigation.
The court has focused on two extra-textual considerations: (1)
the nature of the cause of action at the basis of the suit; and (2) the
connection between the state action a defendant is attempting to
remove and the "parent" case the defendant is piggybacking on.
The court has applied a sort of Posnerian "imaginative
reconstruction" by asking, "Is this really the kind of case Congress
would have wanted to be removed to federal court?" The Eastern
District's express reliance on policy to trim the removal provisions
appears counterintuitive to its holding defining accident, which
threatens to circumvent the policy of the MMTJA.97
The Eastern District's second extra-textual consideration
focuses on the nature of the cause of action potentially removable
under § 1441 and its relationship with the § 1369(a) cause of action
on which the former case is attempting to piggyback into federal
court. A near-identical claim must exist in both instances in order
96. For a discussion of the constitutional problems which might be
implicated by the MMTJA's broad removal provisions, see Rafoth, supra note
40, at 271-77.
97. As of yet, no case has appeared in the litigation that mirrors the "ideal
form" the court concludes Congress intends to be removed to federal court under
§ 1441(e)(1). It would be interesting to speculate on the availability of other
procedural mechanisms that could be utilized to aggregate a larger number of
claimants together, and therefore add up (literally) to the assumed requisite
number of parties in order to properly appear in federal court.
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for the § 1441 case to be removed to federal court. Two of the
earliest cases to be filed following Hurricane Katrina provide the
clearest example of this required connection.
Chehardy v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. was filed in the
Nineteenth Judicial District on September 15, 2005 and included a
petition for class certification. 98 The plaintiffs brought suit against
the Louisiana Commissioner of Insurance and fifteen foreign and
domestic insurers seeking declaratory relief that insurance policies
that contained flood exclusion provisions not be enforced in
Louisiana. 99 The plaintiffs suffered property damage in Orleans
and Jefferson Parishes, which they claimed resulted from
Hurricane Katrina and the levee breaks that followed throughout
the city.1 00 The defendant insurers removed the case to the Middle
District of Louisiana, basing federal jurisdiction in part on §
1369(a). The plaintiffs then filed a motion to remand the case,
which Judge Polozola denied.'l 0 He then transferred the case to
the Eastern District and it was subsequently consolidated with
other "levee breach" cases currently pending in the Eastern
District.102

Chehardy is a pivotal case, and not only because it may have
been one of the first cases to be filed following Katrina and to
invoke jurisdiction under the MMTJA. Until other cases were
filed later in federal court, it became the case on which other cases
filed in state court have attempted to piggyback their way into
federal court under § 1441(e)(1)(B). In this regard, perhaps the
most significant case is Wallace v. Louisiana Citizens Property
Insurance Corp.103 The case has the distinction of being the only
case thus far to result in a reported decision on the MMTJA by any
federal court of appeal. The case was originally filed on December
98. No. 05-1140 (M.D. La. filed Mar. 16, 2006).
99. Petition, supra note 60, at 1-3.
100. Petition for Class Certification, at 2-3, Chehardy, No. 05-1140 (M.D.
La. filed Mar. 16, 2006).
101. Chehardy v. Wooley, No. 05-1140, slip op. at 2 (M.D. La. Mar. 16,
2006). In the oral reasons for his ruling, Judge Polozola simply stated that the
court "has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to .

.

. 28 U.S.C. 1369."

This brief statement plays a pivotal part in subsequent litigation.
102. Id.
103. No. 06-0114, 2006 WL 380757 (E.D. La. Feb. 15, 2006).

Id.
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12, 2005 in Louisiana state court (Plaquemines Parish). The
plaintiffs sued under the Louisiana Valued Policy Law' 0 4 asserting
that defendants should pay the full amount of the policy if any part
of the total property loss occurred because of a covered peril.'05
Again, the defendant insurers removed the case to the Eastern
District, basing jurisdiction on § 1441(e)(1)(B). 1"6 The defendants
claimed that the court had federal jurisdiction under §
1441(e)(1)(B) since they were also defendants in the Chehardy
action, at the time still pending before Judge Polozola for his ruling
on the motion to remand. The defendants argued that since the
Wallace case also arose from the same accident, Hurricane
Katrina, or from the levee breaks0 7 caused by the hurricane, as in
Wallace, jurisdiction was proper.'
Judge Livaudais granted the plaintiffs motion to remand the
case to state court. Although he observed that jurisdiction might
not be proper because the Wallace case could not have been
brought under § 1369, citing a lack of minimal diversity, Judge
Livaudais actually granted the remand motion on the basis that the
pending action fell under the abstention provisions of § 1369(b).'08
He held that the case "fits squarely into the 'exception' to
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1369, Subsection (b)." 109 The
defendants appealed this ruling to the United States Fifth Circuit,
which after finding that it had appellate jurisdiction, reversed
Judge Livaudais. 10 In its opinion, the United States Fifth Circuit
held that "[t]he district court misapplied the mandatory §1369(b)
abstention to the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction established
by §1441(e)(1)(B). Section 1369(a) applies only to original
jurisdiction under § 1369(a)."1 11 The case was remanded to the
Eastern District, at which time the plaintiffs filed a second motion
104. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22:695 (2007).
105. Petition, supra note 60, at 1-3.
106. Id. at 3.
107. Id.
108. Wallace, No. 06-0114, 2006 WL 380757, at *2 (E.D. La. Feb. 15,

2006).
subject
109.
110.
111.

Judge Livaudais' observation seems incorrect because the basis for
matter jurisdiction over Wallace was § 1441(e)(1)(B), not § 1369(a).
Id.
Wallace v. La. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., 444 F.3d 697 (5th Cir. 2006).
Id. at702.
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for remand, this time arguing that federal jurisdiction under §
1441(e)(1)(B) was improper because the Wallace case did not arise
from the same "accident" as the Chehardy case. 112 Judge
Livaudais, with very little discussion, held that because the cause
of action in the Wallace case was essentially a dispute over the
extent of coverage guaranteed by the contract, it did not arise from
the same accident as the Chehardy action, which sought
declaratory relief over damages caused by the breach of the levees.
Judge Livaudais apparently saw a distinction between the two
causes of action, which led him to conclude that the Wallace case
was not appropriately in federal court under the MMTJA and
should be remanded. The Eastern District has followed the trend
established by Chehardy and Wallace to conclude that when an
insufficient connection exists between the two causes of
action, the
3
§ 1441 (e)(1)(B) case will be remanded to state court."
The Eastern District's consideration of the nature of the case
the defendant attempts to remove to federal court and its
connection to the case properly in federal court under § 1369 is
intended to provide a basis to restrict the application of the broad
removal provisions. The court is turning to the MMTJA's policy
of aggregation to limit removal because of the fear that a plain
interpretation of the statute would justify the removal of any and
all cases that follow the storm, thus flooding the already crowded
dockets. The Eastern District's fear is enhanced following the U.S.
Fifth Circuit's holding in Wallace, discussed further below,
because there is no apparent limitation in the statute on the
application of the removal provisions. Read faithfully to their
plain language, they threaten to allow a flood of cases into the
federal system. The court has developed the two considerations
discussed above, based on the policy of aggregation in the
MMTJA, in order to prevent this flood. The Eastern District has
112. Memorandum in Support of Motion for Remand at 2, Wallace, 2006
WL 380757, at *1-2.
113. See, e.g., Berry v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 06-4922, 2006 WL 2710588, at
*3 (E.D. La. Sept. 19, 2006) (noting that the "instant case" made no allegations
about levee breaches involved in the Chehardy case). It should be noted that
this inserts into § 1441(e)(1)(B) a limitation that is not present in the statute.
The statute does not require "connexity" between the two causes of action. It
simply says they must "arise from" the same accident.
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concluded that cases with only a few parties, essentially involving
insurance contract limits or claims, unconnected in any substantial
way to the § 1369(a) case on which the defendant is attempting to
piggyback into federal court, should be remanded to state court
because they do not fit the general purpose of the statute.
The interpretive considerations suggested by Judge Posner split
both ways in assessing this component of the jurisprudential trend.
The only conclusion a judge can reach imagining what Congress
would have wanted is that the cases should be removed to federal
court if they meet the plain text of § 1441(e)(1)(B). This
"imaginative reconstruction" broadly accords with the aggregative
policy underlying the MMTJA. Therefore, those cases remanded
to state court should probably have been retained by the federal
court when the defendants were also parties to actions under §
1369(a). No outside consideration should have been given to the
nature of the claim or the number of parties or the connection
between the two claims. The plain text simply provides federal
jurisdiction over all cases resulting from the same accident.
On the other hand, the most reasonable result approach might
justify remanding these actions to state court. A reasonable result
would be to prevent over-aggregation of cases in the federal
system, particularly cases involving relatively insignificant claims
over insurance contracts. Again, given the shortcomings in the
statute, it is defensible that the federal courts, ever protective of the
limits of jurisdiction, would turn to these considerations as a
limitation on the application of the plain language of the statute.
By not trimming the removal provisions, the policy underlying the
MMTJA is significantly hampered by the real possibility of overaggregation.
Because the policy of aggregation splits both ways, the
jurisprudential treatment of § 1441(e)(1)(B) remains the most
troubling aspect of the trend emerging in the Eastern District. As
noted, the plain language of the MMTJA requires that cases that fit
within the statute be removed, no matter how "insignificant" they
may appear. At the same time, the plain language of the statute
threatens the potentially dire result of over-aggregation. Once
again, the MMTJA's own provisions provide the pretext for the
problems the Eastern District is having with this statute. This flaw
was exacerbated by the Fifth Circuit's Wallace holding that the
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abstention provision does not apply to § 1441(e). The Comment
now turns to this final aspect of the jurisprudential trend.
3. Who 's NOT Coming to Dinner: § 1369(b)
The final component of the jurisprudential trend is the
counterintuitive effect of the abstention provision in the Katrina
litigation. The abstention provision has not factored into the
Eastern District's remand decisions. However, the absence of the
abstention provision in the case law has significantly impacted this
litigation; it has been the necessary antecedent to the battles over
the scope of the removal provisions. The Wallace case was the
only case where the abstention provision was applied."14 In
Wallace, after Judge Livaudais granted the plaintiffs motion to
remand, the Fifth Circuit reversed, finding that the application of
the abstention provision in § 1369(b) to a removed case was
inappropriate. 1 The court relied on the language of § 1369(b)
which states that "[t]he district court shall abstain from hearing any
civil action described in subsection (a) .. .. 16 The Fifth Circuit
read this language literally to apply only to cases which were
brought under the original jurisdiction of the federal courts given
in § 1369(a). This ruling is significant for a number of reasons.
First, the lack of limitation provided by § 1369(b) invites the
court to develop extra-textual considerations in order to limit its
jurisdiction. Read literally, the removal provision added by the
MMTJA is all-encompassing, and threatens to throw open the
floodgates to cases which otherwise would properly be in state
court. If the abstention provisions were held applicable to
removed cases, the jurisprudential trend in the Eastern District may
very well have taken on a different shape. If the abstention
provision had been held to be applicable to cases removed to
federal court, this would have provided a textual limitation to the
exercise of jurisdiction. This might have allowed the court to trim
the removal provisions without resorting to extra-textual
considerations.
114. For a review of the facts of Wallace, see the discussion supra Part
III.C.2.
115. Id.
116. 28 U.S.C. § 1369(b) (2006).
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Secondly, the U.S. Fifth Circuit's holding suggests that its
reading of the MMTJA and its underlying policy is more expansive
than the Eastern District's own reading. The issue is similar to that
discussed above in defining the scope of the term "accident."
Which trumps: literal readings of a statute, or broader policies?
The Fifth Circuit expressly invoked the MMTJA's policy of
aggregation in reversing Judge Livaudais' application of the
abstention provision. 17 They read the underlying policy as
requiring that the removal provisions not be encumbered by the
abstention provision. Judge Garza wrote in his opinion for the
panel that "the MMTJA was designed to ameliorate the restrictions
on the exercise of federal jurisdiction that ultimately forced parties
in multiple suits arising from the same disaster to litigate in several
fora. To hamstring the removal statute by misapplying the
abstention provisions would undercut the MMTJA's ultimate goal
of consolidation. 11 8
A narrower reading of the MMTJA,
according to Judge Garza, would impede the policy of total
aggregation.' 19 This reading of the MMTJA strongly suggests that
the Fifth Circuit may have a very different understanding 20of the
statute, and might alter the Eastern District's jurisprudence.
Finally, the Fifth Circuit's Wallace holding raises the
significant possibility that the Eastern District is incorrectly
narrowing the removal provisions. As already mentioned, the Fifth
Circuit's reading of the policy of the MMTJA would appear to
require that meeting the plain language of the removal provision is
sufficient to allow removal of the case. This means that the
Eastern District's extra-textual considerations are misplaced.
According to the Fifth Circuit, the determination that a case should
be removed under § 1441(e)(1) is wholly independent from any
other consideration. Again, Judge Garza explained that when the
requirements of § 1441(e)(1)(B) are met, defendants need not
117. Wallace v. La. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., 444 F.3d 697, 702 (5th Cir.
2006).
118. Id.
119. Id.

120. It may be very difficult for the Fifth Circuit to re-shape the
jurisprudential trend, however, as its own Wallace opinion makes clear the
difficulty with appealing remand orders under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). Id.at 70001.
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establish the existence of independent subject matter jurisdiction
under any other provision, including under § 1369(a), because
supplemental jurisdiction has been established. 12' This reading,
the court goes on to note, is consonant with the MMTJA's purpose,
and contrary considerations would serve to "undercut the
MMTJA's ultimate goal.' 22 This opinion clearly shows the
divergent readings of the policy implications between the Eastern
District and the Fifth Circuit. It also leaves open the possibility
that the Eastern District's policy considerations themselves will be
trimmed23 by the Fifth Circuit, giving the removal provisions full
effect. 1
IV.

CONCLUSION-FORECASTING THE FuTuRE?

Tentative insights into the future of both the litigation arising
from Hurricane Katrina and the MMTJA itself can be drawn from
understanding the current jurisprudential trend. A necessary
subtext is the adequacy of this judicial interpretation. The Eastern
District's interpretation of the statute has been closely tied to an
analysis of its text and purpose, the ordinary tools for
interpretation, in light of the particular context of Hurricane
Katrina. Lamentably, this interpretation has blunted the MMTJA's
impact on the hurricane litigation and has foreclosed a single
forum for the aggregation of these cases that could effectively
ensure their fair and efficient adjudication. Given the significant
121.

Id.

122. Id.
at 702.
123. There is a counter-argument to the Fifth Circuit's holding, however,
from the language of the statute itself. The court apparently entertained this
argument, and dismissed it in footnote 6 of its opinion. Section 1441(e)(5)
states that "[a]n action removed under this [§ 1441(e)(1)] shall be deemed an
action under section 1369 ....
" This raises the possible argument that the court,
rather than expansively reading the statute, is actually too narrowly reading the
statute's provisions which will result in the dreaded scenario of over-aggregation
in the Eastern District. It is plausible to argue that because cases removed under
§ 1441(e)(1) must result from the same accident as the § 1369(a) case, it does in
some sense fall under § 1369. The court dismissed this argument, however, by
stating in footnote 6 that § 1441(e)(5) applies only to "certain procedural
requirements." Wallace, 444 F.3d at 702 n.6. However, this statement fails to
take the argument seriously.
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problems inherent in the MMTJA's provisions, however, the
Eastern District's interpretation reflects a common sense concern
with over-aggregation of cases and the resultant problems of
inefficiency and unfairness. Given the significant interpretive
problems with the statute, the fault for the MMTJA's
ineffectiveness lies mostly with the statute itself.
What does the future look like in the light of this present
jurisprudence? For the continued hurricane litigation, the trend has
broken in favor of limited application of the MMTJA and this
appears unlikely to change in the near future. This conclusion
means that the vast majority of suits are likely to be pursued
individually and in state court, unless complete diversity is pursued
or the Class Action Fairness Act applies. The ability of the state
district courts, especially in those areas most affected by the storm
and where these suits are most likely to be filed, remains unclear.
The procedural devices available under state law have arguably not
24
faced any situation remotely similar to the Katrina litigation.
The MMTJA itself is perhaps the greatest victim in this litigation.
The statute is a cumbersome, awkward piece of legislative
machinery. This litigation and its interpretation heretofore have
revealed significant problems inherent in the language of the
statute itself. The terms of the statute lack the definiteness
apparently intended by Congress, as the tortured interpretation of
"accident" crystallizes.
The significant problems for the MMTJA, which its application
to hurricane litigation has exposed, most likely require
congressional action to remedy. If Congress' attempted remedy to
the problems of complex litigation in the MMTJA is to be
successful, the drafting ambiguities in the Act will need to be
amended. The definition of accident in subsection (c) will need to
be broadened in order to encompass an event of whatever nature
that triggers the filing of multiple suits against few defendants in
multiple state and federal courts. As this Comment has argued, the
distinction in the definition of accident between an "accident" and
124. For a comprehensive overview of the various procedural mechanisms
available under the state rules of procedure, see Charles S. McCowan, Jr. &
Calvin C. Fayard, Jr., Louisiana Complex Litigation, 80 TUL. L. REv. 1905
(2006).
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a "natural event" appears to make no sense given the policies at
stake. Congress must also act to provide some limitation on the
removal of cases under § 1441(e)(1)(B). These two actions would
serve to patch the significant weaknesses the Katrina litigation has
exposed in the MMTJA.
Fixing the significant problems in the statute exposed by the
Eastern District's interpretation of it will assist the courts in
achieving the significant policy goals of fair and efficient
adjudication of claims, particularly in the context of events such as
Hurricane Katrina where those policy goals are significantly
heightened. That the MMTJA fails to achieve these goals because
of its inherent flaws, which the Eastern District has exposed,
means that the long-sought solution to complex litigation may still
be in the making.
JoshuaA. DeCuir*

* The author wishes to express a word of gratitude to Mr. Alston Johnson
who graciously advised the writing of this paper. A lawyer's lawyer and a
consummate scholar-he is a teacher in every way.

